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†  Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This essay was originally 
presented at the Case Western Reserve School of Law symposium on 
“Marijuana, Federal Power, and the States.” I am grateful to Jonathan 
Adler and the Law Review for the invitation to participate, to Scott 
Anderson for research assistance, and to my co-panelists, Brannon 
Denning and Robert Mikos, who have labored long in this vineyard and 
whose work taught me most of what I know about marijuana and 
federalism. My errors, of course, should not be laid at their door. I am 
also thankful to and for my wife, Erin—not only (as always) for her love 
and support but also for her insights as an Assistant U.S. Attorney into 
federal law enforcement policy. 
 Finally, I hope no one will mistake my views on the federalism issues 
here for endorsement of marijuana legalization as a policy matter. I 
continue to think that that is a terrible idea. But our constitutional 
system provides states with room to innovate, even if some innovations 
are misguided.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
Modern-Day Nullification 
770 
 
Introduction 
In 1832, South Carolina’s famous nullification ordinance declared 
that the federal tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were null and void within the 
boundaries of that state.1 The ordinance, which built on a strong 
theory of state sovereignty advanced by John C. Calhoun, did not 
exactly prosper. President Andrew Jackson—like Calhoun, born in 
South Carolina—rejected nullification in principle, threatened to  
enforce the tariff by force, then undercut the state’s practical position 
by introducing new legislation to radically lower that same tariff. 2 No 
other state joined South Carolina’s protest, and, in fact, eight 
Southern state legislatures passed resolutions condemning the South 
Carolinians’ action.3 And if that denouement did not suffice to settle 
the question of whether a state may defy a valid federal law, well, 
there was also the “late unpleasantness” of 1861–65.4 
Fast-forward, however, to November 2012, when the states of 
Colorado and Washington both voted to legalize recreational  
marijuana use—also in contravention of federal law and policy.5 These 
states joined the District of Columbia and twenty other states that 
have legalized the drug for medicinal purposes. 6  California and 
 
1. See South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, Nov. 24, 1832, available 
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ordnull.asp. 
2. See Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The 
Transformation of America, 1815–1848, at 395–410 (2007) 
(describing South Carolina’s nullification motive and plan, and 
President Jackson’s response); Richard E. Ellis, The Union at 
Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights, and the 
Nullification Crisis (1987) 41–73 (detailing Jackson’s and Calhoun’s 
fight over nullification).  
3. HOWE, supra note 2, at 406–07. 
4. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional 
Interpretation, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 691, 693 n.4 (2004) (asserting that 
the legality of secession had been settled in the case of “Grant v. Lee”). 
5. See Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal 
Questions Remain, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15. 
6. See Alaska Stat. § 17.37.030 (2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2811 
(2012); Cal. Health & Safety Code §11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2007); 
Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-408a 
(West 2014); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4903A (Supp. 2014); D.C. 
Code § 7-1671.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329-
122(2013); 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 130/25 (West Supp. 2014); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2423-A (Supp. 2014); Md. Code 
Ann., Health–Gen. § 13-3313 (West Supp. 2014); Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. ch. 94C App., § 1-4 (West Supp. 2014); Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 333.26424 (West Supp. 2014); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 152.32 (West Supp. 2014); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-46-319 (2013); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 453A.200 (Lexis-Nexis 2009); N.H. Rev. 
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Colorado—pioneers in legalizing medical and recreational marijuana 
use, respectively—have fared better than did South Carolina in the 
1830s. Other states have followed their lead, prompting a national 
debate about marijuana use. Even the District of Columbia—a federal 
enclave governed by “federal” law—has defied Congress by legalizing 
recreational use. 7  And President Obama—rather than reprising  
Andrew Jackson’s threat to “hang the first man of them [nullifiers 
resisting federal authority] I can get my hands on to the first tree I 
can find”8—has instructed his Departments of Justice and Treasury to 
accommodate these state departures from federal norms.9  
 
Stat. Ann. § 126-X:2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 24:6I-6 (West Supp. 2014); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-2 (West 
2013); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.319 (West 2003); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 21-28.6-4 (2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4474b (2013); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 69.51A.040 (2013); see generally Robert A. Mikos, 
Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y 5, 5 (2013) [hereinafter Mikos, Preemption] (surveying 
developments in marijuana legalization). 
7. See Melanie Eversley, D.C. Marijuana Decriminalization Law Takes Ef-
fect, USA Today (July 17, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www.usatoday. 
com/story/news/nation/2014/07/17/dc-marijuana-law/12770301/ (not-
ing the conflict with federal law). 
8. HOWE, supra note 2, at 406 (quoting 2 Augustus C. Buell, History 
of Andrew Jackson 244–45 (1904)). 
9. See Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Dep’t of the 
Treasury, FIN-2014-G001, Guidance: BSA Expectations 
Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses (2014); Memorandum 
from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
All United States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related 
Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-wdwa/legacy/2014/02 
/14/DAG%20Memo%20-%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Marijuana%20 
Related%20Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%2014%20%282%29.pdf; 
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to All United States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana 
Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov 
/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf; Memorandum from 
James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
United States Att’ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in 
Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June 
29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use. 
pdf; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y General, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Selected United States Att’ys, Investigations and 
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 
19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/ 
legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf. 
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Across a range of issues—including, for example, health insur-
ance,10 experimental medicines,11 gun control,12 sports gambling,13 and 
immigration14—states are acting contrary to federal law policy. Unlike 
South Carolina’s infamous ordinance, most of these instances of 
modern-day nullification may well be legal. They generally do not 
purport to alter the binding force of federal law, but they rely on the 
likelihood that, as a practical matter, federal authorities cannot 
enforce national law without the cooperation of state officials.15 The 
history of marijuana legalization over the past decades suggests that, 
at least on some issues, contemporary nullification is a winning 
strategy.  
This Article asks what modern-day nullification can tell us about 
the health and structure of contemporary federalism. Contemporary 
resistance to federal law is made possible by the structure of cooper-
 
10. The Advisory Bd. Co., Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion, 
Daily Briefing (Feb. 11, 2015), www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/ 
resources/primers/medicaidmap (noting that nineteen states have 
rejected the Affordable Care Act’s invitation to expand Medicaid). 
11. See Kimberly Leonard, Seeking the Right to Try, U.S. News & World 
Rep. (Nov. 18, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/art 
icles/2014/11/18/right-to-try-laws-allowing-patients-to-try-experimental-
drugs-bypass-fda (noting that five states have passed “right to try” laws 
that “allow terminally ill patients access to drugs that have not been 
approved by the [federal] government”). 
12. See Justine McDaniel, Robby Korth & Jessica Boehm, In States, a 
Legislative Rush to Nullify Federal Gun Laws, WASH. POST BLOG (Aug. 
30, 2014, 1:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp 
/2014/08/29/in-states-a-legislative-rush-to-nullify-federal-gun-laws/ 
(noting that eleven states have passed laws purporting to forbid enforce-
ment of federal gun laws in the state). 
13. See James Surowiecki, A Call to Action, NEW YORKER (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/02/11/a-call-to-action 
(noting that New Jersey has legalized sports gambling despite its 
continuing illegality under federal law). 
14. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) 
(upholding Arizona law enforcing restrictions on employment of undocu-
mented aliens more strictly than under federal policy). 
15. See generally Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical 
Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 1419 (2009) [hereinafter Mikos, Limits of Supremacy] 
(exploring the often ignored ability of states to permit conduct other-
wise prohibited by Congress). The gun control nullification laws—which 
have a similar structure to South Carolina’s nineteenth-century ordi-
nance—appear to be an exception. And federal authorities may be 
willing to contest state defiance in areas other than marijuana enforce-
ment. The Justice Department has sued New Jersey, for example, to 
contest New Jersey’s action on sports betting. See Surowiecki, supra 
note 13. 
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ative federalism, under which federal and state authorities share over-
lapping regulatory jurisdiction and state officials frequently partic-
ipate in the implementation and enforcement of federal regulatory 
schemes.16 This interdependent relationship gives rise to what Heather 
Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen have called the “power of the ser-
vant”: because federal authorities depend on state officials to enforce 
federal law, state officials have opportunities to influence the shape of 
federal regulation and, sometimes, to resist aspects of federal policy 
that they do not like.17 Modern-day nullification goes beyond the “un-
cooperative federalism” described by Professors Gerken and Bulman-
Pozen, however; rather than subverting federal marijuana policy by 
nibbling around the edges, Colorado and Washington have gone on 
strike. And as the marijuana controversy illustrates, state officials de-
rive the power to defy federal policy from the fact that they are not 
servants, but rather officers of a different government with an inde-
pendent base of legitimacy and accountability. 
It is hard to know how far contemporary state officials will go to 
defy federal policy. Certainly the circumstances of contemporary de-
bate about marijuana legalization are particularly auspicious—
marijuana enforcement is a low priority at best for federal officials, 
national public opinion favors legalization, and the national Executive 
is both sympathetic to legalization and fond of not enforcing federal 
laws with which it disagrees. Some of these circumstances may well 
prove ephemeral even as to marijuana, and several will not translate 
well to other issues on which states wish to depart from federal 
norms. Modern-day nullification may have important advantages, 
however, including not only the traditional benefits of federalist policy 
diversity but also the potential to defuse important and intractable 
problems of separation of powers at the national level. Rather than 
viewing modern-day nullification as yet another obstacle to federal 
policy to be overcome, Congress may wish to consider institutionaliz-
ing aspects of state power to depart from federal policy.  
 
16. See Morton Grodzins, The American System: A New View of 
Government in the United States 4 (Daniel J. Elazar ed. 1966) 
(observing that, in modern America, “virtually all governments are 
involved in virtually all functions. . . . [T]here is hardly any activity 
that does not involve the federal, state, and some local government in 
important responsibilities”); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional 
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 665 
(2001) (“[C]ooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory 
authority between the federal government and the states that allows 
states to regulate within a framework delineated by federal law.”). 
17. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Feder-
alism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1264 (2009). 
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I. Cooperative Federalism and 
Marijuana Legalization 
Federal law classifies marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug18 under the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA),19 based on a finding that it has no 
accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.20 The CSA thus 
categorically prohibits the manufacture, distribution, and possession 
of marijuana.21 And the federal prohibition has been upheld against 
both charges that it exceeds Congress’s commerce power and claims 
that, for medical patients at least, it contravenes a fundamental right 
of access to pain relief.22 Although some of us still think the Court 
erred in upholding the CSA as applied to personal possession and con-
sumption of marijuana for medicinal purposes, in the absence of any 
commercial transaction or movement across state lines,23 that ship has 
sailed. The federal marijuana ban is thus “the supreme Law of the 
Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”24 
Except that in Boulder, Colorado, it is easier to find a head shop 
than a coffee shop.25 The reason has to do with the cooperative feder-
alism structure of criminal law enforcement. Generally speaking, 
federal and state governments not only share constitutional jurisdic-
tion over drug crimes, but they have also criminalized largely the 
same behavior. As a practical matter, however, federal authorities 
play a decidedly secondary role. The overall ratio of federal to state 
and local law enforcement personnel in this country is roughly one to 
ten,26 and drug enforcement is not the priority it once was. In 2007, 
 
18. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2014).  
19. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–971 (2012)). 
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012). 
21. See id. §§ 841, 844. 
22. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Commerce Clause); Raich v. 
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 861–66 (9th Cir. 2007) (substantive due 
process). 
23. See Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the 
Federalist Revival after Gonzales v Raich, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. 
24. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
25. Or at least so it was reported by a notable federalism scholar who went 
out looking for the latter (so she says) but found only the former at a 
recent conference at the University of Colorado. 
26. See Brian A. Reaves & Matthew J. Hickman, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Census of 
State & Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2000 1 (2002); Brian 
A. Reaves & Lynn M. Bauer, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of 
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federal agents made 7,276 marijuana arrests—less than 1 percent of 
all American marijuana arrests that year.27 Hence, as Robert Mikos 
has observed, “[t]he federal government has too few law enforcement 
agents to handle the large number of potential targets. Simply put, 
the expected sanctions for using or supplying marijuana under federal 
law are too low, standing alone, to deter many prospective marijuana 
users or suppliers.”28 
Federal marijuana policy thus depends heavily on state and local 
enforcement. In this sense, drug policy parallels any number of other 
federal regulatory regimes—from environmental policy to Medicaid—
in which state officials play a critical role in implementing federal 
policy. Drug enforcement differs from these other cooperative feder-
alism regimes in that state officials are not implementing the federal 
drug laws but rather enforcing parallel state prohibitions. But drug 
enforcement involves not only overlapping substantive offenses but 
also coordinated investigation and prosecution strategies; federal pro-
secutors tend to focus on major distribution “kingpins,” for example,29 
while state and local officials prosecute the overwhelming majority of 
minor drug offenses. Hence, the “War on Drugs” amounts to a cooper-
ative federalism regime not all that different, say, from state imple-
mentation of the Clean Air Act. 
One critical difference between the actions of states “legalizing” 
marijuana in defiance of federal policy and South Carolina’s nulli-
fication ordinance in 1832 is the purported effect on the relevant 
federal rights and obligations. For John C. Calhoun and the South 
Carolina legislature, nullification rested on a judgment that the 
federal tariff was unconstitutional.30 Nullifiers thus did not so much 
 
Justice Statistics Bulletin: Federal Law Enforcement 
Officers, 2002 1 (2003); see also William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, 
Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 665, 
665 (2002) (“The federal government has never employed a sizable frac-
tion of the nation’s law enforcement officers or prosecutors, nor housed a 
large portion of its prisoners.”).  
27. See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 15, at 1464. 
28. Id. at 1463. As the husband of a federal prosecutor, however, I must 
note that federal enforcement policy seems to be different with respect 
to marijuana use on federal lands—such as national parks, forests, and 
seashores. At least in North Carolina, marijuana crimes continue to be 
pursued when they occur in these federal enclaves, even though the Feds 
might be unlikely to prosecute such crimes where the state has primary 
jurisdiction. Be careful where you light up!  
29. See Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 15, at 1465 (detailing how 
federal enforcement targets suppliers rather than minor offenders). 
30. The argument was that Congress was empowered to impose tariffs only 
for the purpose of raising revenue and that the tariffs in question had 
been levied to protect Northern industries rather than raise revenue. 
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deny the supremacy of valid federal laws but rather the exclusivity of 
federal judicial review as a mechanism for determining those laws’ 
constitutional validity. 31  States that have legalized marijuana, by 
contrast, do not rely on an argument that the federal CSA is uncon-
stitutional (although many proponents may well think that), and they 
do not purport to affect the binding legal force of the federal prohi-
bition. States like California and Colorado have “legalized” marijuana 
only as a matter of state law. They are simply making a bet—and it 
is a good one—that absent state cooperation, federal law is unlikely to 
be enforced in their states. This is functional—not principled—nulli-
fication, but its effect on the ground is very close to what John C. 
Calhoun’s South Carolina hoped to achieve.32 
If state noncooperation undermines federal enforcement to this 
degree, then one might think federal authorities would have a strong 
argument that state marijuana laws are preempted. After all, surely 
they “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”33 But the anticomman-
deering cases have established that states have no obligation to imple-
ment or enforce federal law unless they voluntarily agree to do so.34 It 
follows that states have no obligation to criminalize conduct simply 
because federal law does, and, in fact, there are any number of federal 
offenses that are not mirrored under state law.35 Just as state mari-
juana laws do not formally question the validity of federal marijuana 
 
See, e.g., H.W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times 439–
41 (2005); Howe, supra note 2, at 396–97. 
31. Lest one think that this resistance was confined to Southern 
slaveholders, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took a similar position that 
it could judge for itself the unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act, 
notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s judgment that the act was 
valid. See David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861, at 
294–95 (1976) (noting that Wisconsin’s defiance “involved nullification 
in a form that even John C. Calhoun had not advocated”). That did not 
work out either. The U.S. Supremes rejected Wisconsin’s position in 
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858), and “the Wisconsin 
court, perceiving that it was a tactical error for antislavery men to sup-
port doctrines of state sovereignty, acquiesced in the decision.” Potter, 
supra, at 295. The Ableman saga nonetheless makes clear that nulli-
fication could work against slavery as well as for it.  
32. Notably, the contemporary Tenth Amendment Center defines “nullifica-
tion” as “[a]ny act or set of acts which renders a law null, void or just 
unenforceable.” Tenth Amendment Center, http://tenthamendment 
center.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).  
33. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
34. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) (making it a crime to gather or deliver 
defense information to aid a foreign government). 
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regulation, I am unaware of any serious legal argument that states 
may not decide not to criminalize marijuana possession (or any other 
crime, for that matter) as a matter of state law. 
The constitutional line between state interference with federal law 
and state participation in federal enforcement was drawn long ago. In 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,36 the Court held that states could not inter-
vene on behalf of putative escaped slaves by enacting personal liberty 
laws that imposed procedural safeguards. But Justice Story’s majority 
opinion also made clear that state officials could not be required to 
participate in the capture or return of escapees37—a holding that 
presaged the modern anticommandeering doctrine. A devoted aboli-
tionist, Justice Story may have hoped that efforts to return escaped 
slaves to their owners would fail without the ability to mandate 
cooperation from state and local law enforcement.  
Prigg’s denouement illustrates a critical weakness of modern-day 
nullification. It turned out that the return of fugitive slaves was cen-
trally important to national efforts to keep the Southern states in the 
Union, and federal authorities were willing to devote significant fed-
eral resources to enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law without state coop-
eration.38 Moreover, many slave owners seem to have relied on self-
help (such as Mr. Prigg himself, a private agent of the owner) to re-
capture their fugitives, so that state noncooperation afforded little 
practical protection to blacks in the free states. There are, in other 
words, only certain circumstances when a state’s decision not to par-
ticipate in a federal regulatory regime will effectuate the state’s own 
policy preferences.  
I return to the prospects of modern-day nullification in Part III. 
First, however, I consider what the phenomenon can tell us about the 
dynamics of cooperative federalism. 
II. State Sovereignty in the Age of 
Cooperative Federalism  
One of the most important developments in federalism scholarship 
over the last decade has been a shift from old questions about the 
boundary between state and federal regulatory authority to new 
questions about the role of state governments and officials within 
cooperative federalism schemes. The Supreme Court’s 1937 “switch in 
time” largely marked the end of the “dual federalism” regime that had 
 
36. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842). 
37.  Id. at 615–16.  
38. See Potter, supra note 31, at 138–39 (concluding that the fugitive 
slave laws were relatively effective even though the second Fugitive 
Slave Act, enacted in 1850, “carefully avoided any attempt to employ 
state officials in its enforcement”). 
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dominated American law for its first century and a half;39 rather than 
separate and exclusive spheres of state power, we now generally pre-
sume that Congress and the states exercise concurrent jurisdiction 
over most subjects.40 Nowadays, the national and state governments 
not only share the same potential regulatory jurisdiction—they also 
frequently work together to implement federal programs.41 Although 
federalism scholars concerned about the autonomy of the states long 
viewed “cooperative federalism” as a euphemism for the absorption 
and cooptation of states into the swirling vortex of federal power,42 
scholars like Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have argued 
that state participation in cooperative regimes offers new opportun-
ities for states to assert “the power of the servant.”43  
The scholarly literature on federalism is only just beginning to 
explore the full implications of cooperative federalism for intergovern-
mental relations and the constitutional balance of power.44 The inter-
governmental drama playing out in Colorado and Washington over 
marijuana helps, I think, to illustrate some of the basic dynamics of 
the cooperative model. Three things are becoming clear. First, federal-
ism is becoming more like the horizontal separation of powers among 
the branches of the national government, in the sense that the consti-
tutional structure is no longer held in place by strict norms of separ-
ation but rather by a regime of interlocking checks and balances. 
Second, state officials implementing federal law exercise power, but 
they are not “servants.” In fact, the most essential aspect of state 
sovereignty in the contemporary era may be the state political com-
munity’s right to select and hold to account its own officers—even 
when they are acting within cooperative federalism schemes. And 
third, intergovernmental conflict over marijuana illustrates the crucial 
 
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
(rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the National Labor Relations 
Act); see generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 
36 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1950).  
40. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of Dual 
Federalism, in Federalism and Subsidiarity 34, 66 (James E. Flem-
ing & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014) [hereinafter Young, Puzzling 
Persistence]. 
41. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
42. See, e.g., Joseph F. Zimmerman, Contemporary American 
Federalism: The Growth of National Power 1 (1992) (arguing 
that the subordinate role of state officials within federal regulatory 
schemes represents a “concentration of political powers in the national 
government . . . .”).  
43. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1265. 
44. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for Uncooperative 
Federalists, 48 Tulsa L. Rev. 427 (2013) (sketching directions for fu-
ture research) [hereinafter Young, Uncooperative Federalists]. 
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differences between preemption of state law and commandeering of 
state officials. Even where Congress’s power to preempt remains 
broad, constitutional limits on preemption afford states crucial inter-
governmental leverage. 
A. Separation vs. Checks and Balances 
Discussions of federalism in this country have, throughout our 
history, typically focused on jurisdictional boundaries. For the first 
century and a half, the “dual federalism” regime posited separate and 
exclusive spheres of state and local authority; after 1937, legislative 
jurisdiction is generally concurrent (with minor exceptions falling out-
side Congress’s broad commerce authority45). Those scholars who have 
grappled with the dynamics of federalism in a concurrent regime have 
typically focused on the interplay of political forces that may protect 
state autonomy,46 the security afforded to states by the procedural 
difficulty of making federal law,47 or the potential of doctrines of 
statutory construction to ease the threat that federal preemption 
poses to state autonomy.48 
This is all valuable work, but the marijuana situation calls 
attention to another structural dynamic more familiar to horizontal 
separation of powers analysis than to federalism: institutional checks 
and balances. One suspects that it is the sour taste of nineteenth-
century nullification (and the secession that followed shortly after-
ward) that has made us reluctant to consider the possibility that 
states might actually check federal government. But regardless of the 
reason, modern courts and commentators have tended to interpret the 
Supremacy Clause as strictly forbidding this sort of thing. As my 
friend Heather Gerken recently observed, American law has “licens[ed] 
opposition” primarily through “a rights-based strategy, not an institu-
 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was beyond the scope of Congress’s 
commerce authority). 
46. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); see also Larry D. Kramer, 
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 219 (2000). 
47. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001). 
48. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The 
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. 
REV. 253, 288–92 (2012) [hereinafter Young, Ordinary Diet]; Garrick B. 
Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511 (2010). 
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tional one.”49 We have lost the sense of federalism facilitating a “loyal 
opposition.”50  
We do find institutional notions of loyal opposition in separation 
of powers law. Although we all get frustrated with gridlock in Wash-
ington, D.C., most of us have calmer moments when we remember 
James Madison’s notion in Federalist 51 that the conflicting interests 
and efforts of officials in the various branches of government are what 
keeps the system in rough balance.51 Opposition, in the Founders’ 
vision, is a key component of the political structure—and that was 
emphatically true of federalism as well as separation of powers.52  
What may be less readily remembered is that the American doc-
trine of checks and balances is a creature of overlapping and con-
current authority, not jurisdictional separation. The draft constitution 
was, in fact, criticized for not adhering to Montesquieu’s ideal that 
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be kept strictly 
separate and exercised by different institutions.53 Madison rebutted 
this criticism by insisting that such jurisdictional boundaries were but 
“parchment barriers,” which could not actually preserve the inde-
pendence, much less the separation, of the branches in practice.54 In 
place of jurisdictional separation, he urged a theory of checks and 
balances predicated on jurisdictional overlap. “[T]he great security 
against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department,” he wrote, “consists in giving to those who administer 
each department the necessary constitutional means and personal mo-
tives to resist encroachments of the others.”55 He thus embraced the 
fact that “[t]he several departments of power are distributed and 
blended,” citing as precedents the overlap of powers among the 
branches in the British and the various state constitutions.56 Juris-
 
49. Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1959 
(2014). 
50. Id. 
51. See The Federalist No. 51, at 318–20 (James Madison) (Isaac Kram-
nick ed., 1987). 
52. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 46, at 299–302 (James Madison) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987) (extolling the efficacy of state opposition to 
national ambitions). 
53. See The Federalist No. 47, at 302–03 (James Madison) (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 1987) (“One of the principal objections inculcated by the 
more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is its supposed viola-
tion of the political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
departments ought to be separate and distinct.”). 
54. The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
55. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 51, at 319. 
56. The Federalist No. 47, supra note 53, at 303–08. 
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dictional and functional overlap rendered each branch dependent on 
the other, because none could act alone. 
Horizontal separation of powers thus offers neglected lessons for 
the preservation of the federal balance in an age of concurrent regula-
tory jurisdiction. As Colorado and Washington are demonstrating, 
their ability to oppose federal policy—and get away with it, to a 
considerable extent—arises from the blending of federal and state in-
stitutions within cooperative federalism schemes. The federal govern-
ment depends on state cooperation to enforce national law, and that 
dependence is what empowers state officials to dissent. As I discuss in 
Part III, this power of opposition may not extend far enough for 
dissenting states to establish and secure their own policies, but they 
can at least force a national conversation and some sort of compro-
mise on the issues they care about. 
B. Of Servants and Sovereigns  
Modern-day nullification trades on the leverage that cooperative 
federalism schemes give state officials, but it also demonstrates that 
the “servant” metaphor can mislead about the actual dynamics of 
these relationships. I thus offer a friendly amendment to the notion of 
“uncooperative federalism” emphasizing that state officials’ capacity 
and motivation for resistance to federal policy stems largely from the 
fact that they are agents of a different principal. 
Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s theory argues that “power 
also resides with states when they play the role of federal servants.”57 
This power stems from several sources. These include the “depen-
dence” of the federal government on state officials to administer fed-
eral programs, which gives state officials both “leverage” and “discre-
tion in choosing how to accomplish [their] tasks and which tasks to 
prioritize.”58 State officials also derive power from their “integration” 
into federal regulatory schemes; “[w]hen an actor is embedded in a 
larger system,” Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue, “a web of connect-
ive tissues binds higher- and lower-level decisionmakers. Regular in-
teractions generate trust and give lower-level decisionmakers the 
knowledge and relationships they need to work the system.”59 Finally, 
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken note that state officials “serve two 
masters” in the sense that although they are implementing federal 
 
57. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1265. 
58. Id. at 1266; see also Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544 (1994) (observing that in a cooperative 
system, “[t]he federal government needs the states as much as the 
reverse, and this mutual dependency guarantees state officials a voice in 
the process”). 
59. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1268–69. 
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policy, “their constituencies are based within the state.”60 This gives 
state officials both the incentive and the power to challenge federal 
officials, because they are not beholden to federal officials for their 
positions and have alternative sources of resources.61 
The last of these factors partially acknowledges—but inadequately 
stresses—what I take to be the critical ingredient of uncooperative 
federalism, which is that state officials do not work for the federal 
government. The truth is, state officials are not servants—or at least 
not servants of the national government. The federal government did 
not hire these officials, nor can they fire them—no matter how 
“uncooperative” they may be. They work for, and are accountable to, 
the people of the state. It may be that state officials are sometimes 
coopted into federal regulatory programs and come to internalize the 
goals of the federal regulators who oversee their work; in some cases, 
this phenomenon might even trump state officials’ loyalties to their 
superiors in state government and to the citizens of their states. 
Whether and to what extent this occurs is an interesting empirical 
question worthy of further investigation. But a vast range of literature 
in political science rests on the assumption that government officials 
wish to retain their jobs, and that those officials are thus responsive 
to those who have the power to fire them or vote them out of office.62 
By that measure, state officials serve one master, not two, and that 
master is their state. 
Modern-day nullification, as illustrated by the marijuana saga, 
vividly illustrates the independence of state officials. It is the limiting 
case of uncooperative federalism—an entire refusal to participate in a 
federal regulatory scheme that is contrary to state policy. And it is 
driven by the fact that although the once-distinct spheres of state and 
federal regulatory authority are now understood to overlap,63 federal 
and state officials continue to confront largely separate chains of 
electoral and administrative accountability. They are agents of 
separate principals. And while the national government has powerful 
leverage (especially financial inducements under the Spending Power) 
to induce state cooperation, the anticommandeering doctrine ensures 
that the choice remains with state governments and, ultimately, the 
state electorate.64 If a state legislature is willing to sacrifice federal 
 
60. Id. at 1270. 
61. Id. at 1270–71. 
62. Likewise, much separation of powers jurisprudence assumes that the 
power to control an executive official is synonymous with the power to 
remove him. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93 (2010). 
63. See, e.g., Young, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 40, at 34–35. 
64. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(striking down the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion on the 
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funding and other inducements in order to opt out of a federal 
regulatory program, state officials have little choice but to walk away. 
This, in turn, suggests that certain aspects of state sovereignty 
and certain forms of federal intervention ought to be particularly 
sensitive from an uncooperative federalism perspective. A state’s 
control over its own officials—whether it takes the form of elections, 
executive control, or accountability to the legislature—is crucial. And 
any federal intervention that threatens to dilute that control ought to 
be particularly suspect. For example, the Supreme Court’s charac-
terization of the Voting Rights Act as a unique threat to state sover-
eignty because it amounted to federal intervention into the process by 
which a state chooses its representatives and officials65 makes a great 
deal of sense from this perspective. And the anticommandeering 
doctrine—which Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken think may 
undermine uncooperative federalism66—is actually critically important 
to its efficacy because that doctrine ensures that state officials remain 
beholden only to their state principals.67 
Much work remains to be done to flesh out the theory of 
uncooperative federalism and verify its empirical claims.68 Examples 
where states decline to participate in cooperative federalism arrange-
ments—like California’s, Colorado’s, and other states’ dissent from 
federal marijuana policy—may well provide insight into more nuanced 
resistance and less spectacular instances of resistance within other 
federal regulatory schemes.  
III. Nullification’s Prospects 
The jury is still out on whether modern-day nullification will meet 
a similar fate to its nineteenth century counterpart. As the preceding 
 
ground that it coerced state governments into administering a federal 
program). 
65. See Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (observ-
ing that “States retain broad autonomy in structuring their govern-
ments” and that “‘[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the 
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be 
chosen’” (quoting Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 
(1892))). 
66. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 17, at 1297 (“A strong 
proponent of uncooperative federalism would embrace commandeering 
not because it increases national power or furthers federal-state cooper-
ation, as most proponents of commandeering would have it, but because 
it facilitates challenges to federal policy.”). 
67. See also Young, Uncooperative Federalists, supra note 44, at 440–42 
(2013) (criticizing Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s criticism of the anticom-
mandeering doctrine). 
68. See id. at 434–52. 
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discussion suggests, the key to modern-day nullification lies in 
charting the boundary between valid preemption of state law and 
invalid commandeering of state governments. I thus begin this last 
section with an assessment of arguments that federal law preempts 
Colorado’s marijuana legalization regime—including an extraordinary 
recent lawsuit filed in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
by the neighboring states of Nebraska and Oklahoma. I then consider 
the more general prospects for modern-day nullification as a form of 
resisting federal encroachments on state autonomy. 
A. Federal Preemption of State Marijuana Laws 
In December 2014, Nebraska and Oklahoma moved for permission 
to file a lawsuit against the state of Colorado in the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, arguing that federal law preempts 
Colorado’s marijuana legalization regime.69 The complaint argues that 
“a state may not establish its own policy that is directly counter to 
federal policy against trafficking in controlled substances or establish 
a state-sanctioned system for possession, production, licensing, and 
distribution of drugs in a manner which interferes with the federal 
drug laws.”70 This statement nicely frames the two crucial aspects of 
the marijuana preemption debate. The first—the claim that “a state 
may not establish its own policy that is directly counter to federal 
policy”71—is rather plainly wrong. But the second—that a state may 
not establish “a state-sanctioned system . . . which interferes with 
the federal drug laws”72—has considerable validity. That principle 
forbidding interference with federal law states the outer limit of 
modern-day nullification, and it suggests that while nullification may 
be an effective means of forcing a political dialogue on a given policy 
question, it cannot itself provide an effective basis for stable state 
governance.  
Begin with the assertion that “a state may not establish its own 
policy that is directly counter to federal policy.”73 That has been 
untrue ever since the early Republic. When Congress enacted the 
 
69. Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support, 
States of Nebraska and Oklahoma v. State of Colorado, No. 220144 
(filed Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter NE & OK Complaint]; see also Lyle 
Denniston, Two States Sue to Block Colorado Marijuana Markets, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 19, 2014, 8:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2014/12/two-states-sue-to-block-colorado-marijuana-markets/. 
70. NE & OK Complaint, supra note 69, at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
71.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
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Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798,74 Virginia and Kentucky not only 
pursued a contrary policy of not persecuting aliens and dissenters but 
vigorously (and officially) protested and worked to undermine 
Congress’s policy.75 Abolitionist states could not interfere with federal 
laws favoring slaveholders, but they certainly pursued a contrary 
policy by outlawing slavery within their own territory and forbidding 
their officials to cooperate with the federal Fugitive Slave law. More 
recently, several states recognized same-sex marriage even though it 
was the avowed policy of the national government to recognize 
marriages only between a man and a woman. 76  Even before the 
Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act on equal 
protection grounds,77 no one thought that state same-sex marriage 
laws were preempted simply because the national government had 
pursued a different policy.  
To take the simplest illustration, imagine that Colorado chose to 
leave marijuana completely unregulated and have no laws on the 
subject at all. It is hard to imagine a state policy that is more 
“directly counter to federal policy” than that. And yet the Supremacy 
Clause certainly does not require states to enact laws that mirror 
federal regulation; as New York v. United States78 held, the anticom-
mandeering doctrine forbids Congress to demand that sort of action.79 
There are two relevant differences between this example and the 
actual state of affairs. The first is that Colorado once did prohibit 
marijuana use; hence, it took an action to repeal significant parts of 
that prohibition rather than simply declining to regulate in the first 
place. That cannot make the constitutional difference, however. The 
Supremacy Clause has never been interpreted to “lock in” state 
policies that the state cannot be required to enact in the first in-
stance.80 
The second difference is that Colorado has done more than decline 
to regulate marijuana; rather, it has put in place a state regulatory 
regime that arguably supports and encourages a line of business that  
74. Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); Alien Act, ch. 58, 
1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800); Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 
(1798), repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5, 2 Stat. 153, 155.  
75. See, e.g., Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: 
Insights from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 Const. 
Comment. 315, 316 (1994). 
76. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, § 7, 110 Stat. 2419 
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)). 
77. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
78. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
79. Id. at 159–66. 
80. For one thing, that sort of policy lock-in would induce states to think 
twice before enacting legislation in support of federal policy. 
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still violates federal law.81 This leads to the second aspect of Nebraska 
and Oklahoma’s preemption claim—that is, that Colorado’s 
regulatory regime actually interferes with the federal policy 
prohibiting marijuana production, distribution, and use. This claim 
does, in my view, raise a plausible preemption argument. 
Colorado has not simply decided not to prohibit marijuana use. 
Rather, it has established a regulatory regime predicated on the 
legality of some marijuana consumption—notwithstanding the contin-
uing prohibition of marijuana cultivation, distribution, and consump-
tion under federal law. Robert Mikos has identified three classes of 
state laws that raise plausible claims of interference with federal 
policy. The first class “regulates the supply of marijuana. This body 
includes regulations that require suppliers to obtain a license from the 
state, laws that dictate how suppliers operate (e.g., zoning), laws that 
tax the sale of marijuana, and so on.”82 A second class regulates 
marijuana consumption—particularly in those states permitting only 
medical uses. For example, this class “includes laws that stipulate the 
steps patients must take to establish eligibility for the medical 
marijuana defense and laws that limit the consumption behavior of 
marijuana users.”83 Finally, “[a] third category of laws arguably pro-
motes marijuana-related activities.”84 These laws may protect mari-
juana users from discrimination or provide public benefits to 
marijuana users; some proposals would go even further and involve 
the state in the cultivation or distribution of the drug.85 
All of these laws arguably encourage behavior that remains a 
violation of federal law. Licensing suppliers or medicinal users to 
distribute or consume marijuana is, literally, licensing a violation of 
the Controlled Substances Act. The states have a good answer to this 
argument, however, which ought to preclude preemption of mere 
licensing laws. State laws on marijuana are currently in a state of 
flux, and those states that have legalized (or decriminalized) the drug 
have done so only partially, for certain persons or in certain quantities 
or circumstances. Citizens have a right under the Due Process Clause 
to fair notice as to when the state will prosecute them and when it 
will not.86 From this perspective, a state “license” is merely an official 
 
81. See John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding: 
A Report on the State’s Implementation of Legalization, 65 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 649 (2015).  
82. Mikos, Preemption, supra note 6, at 31. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 32. 
85. Id. at 32–36. 
86. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (“‘No one 
may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the 
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what 
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statement from the state that a person’s behavior falls within the 
zone that is immune from prosecution under state law. It is not at all 
clear that Congress could constitutionally enact a statute preventing 
the states from giving clear notice of what acts are crimes under state 
law—and even less clear that Congress intended to do so in the 
Controlled Substances Act. 
Other aspects of the state regulatory scheme, however, cannot 
readily be characterized as efforts to give fair notice. Certainly 
proposals to have the state cultivate marijuana in order to safeguard 
its quality are preempted (and could well lead to actual federal 
prosecution of state officials). Laws that prohibit private individuals 
from discriminating against marijuana users effectively seek to remove 
the stigma and private consequences ordinarily attendant upon 
violations of federal law. To the extent that all laws depend on social 
norms as well as public enforcement for their effectiveness, such 
efforts to undermine those norms would stand as an obstacle to the 
purposes of federal law.  
Nonetheless, the mere legalization of marijuana use—apart from 
efforts to regulate it just discussed—should pass a preemption 
challenge. The CSA does not expressly preempt such legalization in 
that it does not purport to require states to enact parallel prohib-
itions, and if it did, it would raise serious anticommandeering prob-
lems.87 And its antipreemption clause disavows any intent to “occupy 
the field” of marijuana regulation.88 That leaves conflict preemption, 
which comes in two flavors: “impossibility” preemption,89 and “pur-
poses and objectives” or “obstacle” preemption.90 
Impossibility preemption is unlikely. As Professor Mikos points 
out, “[a] citizen can obey a state law allowing or even authorizing the 
possession, distribution, or cultivation of marijuana and the CSA’s 
express ban on these same activities by not engaging in them.”91 
Brannon Denning’s contribution to this Symposium thinks this 
answer “carr[ies] verbal wizardry too far, deep into the forbidden land 
 
the State commands or forbids.’” (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 
U.S. 451, 453 (1939))). 
87. See also Mikos, Limits of Supremacy, supra note 15, at 1451 (“Notably, 
the CSA does not proscribe omissions; that is, it does not impose any 
duty to act . . . such as a duty to report known violations.”). 
88. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
89. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963) (noting that state law is preempted “where compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”). 
90. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that preemp-
tion occurs when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”). 
91. Mikos, Preemption, supra note 6, at 27–28. 
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of the sophists.”92 But impossibility preemption is supposed to be 
extremely narrow. The broadest expansion of the impossibility 
category occurred in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,93 which held that a 
generic drug manufacturer could not comply with both a state tort 
duty requiring it to change its warning label and a federal regulatory 
regime that required FDA approval to do so. “The question for 
‘impossibility,’” Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, “is whether 
the private party could independently do under federal law what state 
law requires of it.”94 Here, state law requires nothing of individuals—
no one is making them grow, distribute, or consume marijuana. And 
the impossibility notion does not run in the opposite direction, to 
require preemption wherever state law allows what federal law pro-
hibits. If it did, then the Supremacy Clause would require each state 
to enact espionage statutes. 
What about “obstacle” preemption? Professor Denning “find[s] it 
self-evident that state legalization regimes permitting marijuana use 
for medical or recreational purposes present a substantial obstacle to 
the implementation of a federal law that (1) recognizes no medical use 
for marijuana and (2) seeks to eliminate the national market in mari-
juana by banning all production, possession, and transfer.”95 And the 
Nebraska and Oklahoma Complaint claims that the federal CSA 
regime will be “undercut unless the intrastate activity . . . were 
regulated as well as the interstate and international activity.”96 That 
may be so, but that fact cannot itself compel Colorado to regulate the 
intrastate activity. Federal law can—and does—regulate intrastate 
marijuana production, distribution, and consumption,97 and Colorado 
may not affirmatively interfere with that regulatory effort. But the 
 
92. Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and 
Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 567, 578 (2015) (quoting National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2656 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting)). 
93. 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577 (2011); see also Young, Ordinary Diet, supra note 
48, at 288–92 (discussing PLIVA and the impossibility standard). 
94. Id. at 2579. “Independently” was the key point in PLIVA, because the 
plaintiffs pointed out that the defendant drug manufacturer could have 
applied for FDA approval to change the license as required by state law. 
Impossibility should only exist, plaintiffs (and the Court’s dissenters) 
said, if the defendant could show that federal approval would not have 
been forthcoming. Id. at 2588–89 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
95. Denning, supra note 92, at 580. 
96. NE & OK Complaint, supra note 69, at 6. 
97. The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate 
activity where necessary to support its interstate regulatory efforts even 
during the Lochner era. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United 
States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914).  
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anticommandeering doctrine necessarily means that it cannot be 
required to help without its consent.  
Consider, for example, Prigg v. Pennsylvania,98 in which Pennsyl-
vania’s “personal liberty law” required agents of slave owners to 
satisfy a state court that the person they proposed to apprehend was, 
in fact, a fugitive slave before exercising their rights under the federal 
Fugitive Slave Act to return her to her owner. Justice Story’s 
majority opinion held the liberty law preempted in what nowadays 
would be a classic case of obstacle preemption: the state law threw up 
significant barriers to the owner’s exercise of rights guaranteed under 
federal law. But Story was also careful to say that state officials and 
courts need not assist in the repatriation of allegedly escaped slaves. 
Practically speaking, this was surely an obstacle too—given the 
preponderance of state officials and the more ready availability of 
state tribunals. Allowing the states to opt out of fugitive slave 
enforcement would inevitably make that enforcement more difficult. 
But this is the difference between preemption and commandeering: 
“obstacles” posed by state officials’ decisions not to help enforce 
federal law are not the sort of obstacles upon which preemption may 
rest. 
Even apart from preemption, however, the continuing federal 
prohibition will make it extremely difficult for legalizing states to 
establish a stable regime. Limited federal enforcement remains 
possible in a variety of scenarios. Federal authorities may choose to 
target marijuana businesses or commercial-scale growers. They may 
use marijuana charges as a lever against persons targeted for some 
other reasons (including arbitrary ones). The federal illegality of 
marijuana businesses also has a host of collateral consequences: 
marijuana businesses may be unable to access the banking world on 
account of federal prohibitions on financial transactions involving 
illegal activity;99 they may face damaging federal tax consequences;100 
and state ethics rules may prevent attorneys from counseling persons 
who engage in activities that remain illegal under federal law.101 Like-
wise, individuals using marijuana in violation of federal law may face 
significant employment or family law consequences, and persons on 
probation or parole may find that marijuana use constitutes a viola-
 
98. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); see supra note 36 and accompanying text 
(discussing Prigg). 
99. See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 597, 600 (2015); Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, 
Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana 
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 74, 91–93 (2015). 
100. See Chemerinsky, Forman, Hopper & Kamin, supra note 99, at 94. 
101. See id. at 95–97. 
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tion of that status.102 Finally, not everyone is Justice Holmes’s “bad 
man”—that is, motivated only by the fear of sanctions.103 Even if 
adverse legal consequences are unlikely, some persons may have 
strong moral or religious aversions to lawbreaking.104 
States like Colorado and California thus have not succeeded—and 
cannot succeed, on their own—in making either recreational or 
medicinal use of marijuana legal, either as a formal or as a practical 
matter. They have, instead, created a highly unstable situation that is 
unlikely to satisfy proponents of either legalization or prohibition over 
the long term. Legalization cannot achieve its goals—a safe, above-
board, and well-regulated market for marijuana—in the teeth of a 
continuing federal prohibition. But that prohibition will hardly be a 
legitimate, nonarbitrary legal regime in the absence of state and local 
enforcement partners. Something will have to give. 
The remarkable thing for students of federalism is that a handful 
of states have been able to force both a fundamental rethinking of na-
tional marijuana policy and to secure significant exemptions from 
federal law—notwithstanding the clear mandate of the Supremacy 
Clause that federal law trumps state policy. The inability to establish 
a stable state regulatory regime for marijuana free of federal inter-
ference should not blind us to this fact. Destabilizing a federal policy 
that had endured for many decades and opening a national conversa-
tion on the issue is a major accomplishment for this handful of dis-
senting states. It is, after all, just the sort of thing that a loyal 
opposition is supposed to do. 
B. Other Applications? 
It is difficult to say whether the effective nullification of national 
marijuana laws in a significant and growing proportion of American 
states is likely to become a more general feature of our federalism, 
impacting a broader array of federal regulatory regimes. Modern-day 
nullification seems unlikely to work outside a fairly narrow range of 
legal and political circumstances. Within those bounds, however, it 
may offer an attractive mechanism for harnessing the dynamism of 
contemporary state governments in an era of federal gridlock. More-
over, it may also hold out some promise for defusing certain problems 
vexing the separation of powers at the federal level. 
 
102. See id. at 98–100. 
103. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 
(1897). 
104. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 55–56 (1972) 
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voluntary compliance without regard to the practical threat of 
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Marijuana-style nullification makes sense only with respect to 
regulatory problems with a particular legal structure. A state’s 
preferences must be more libertarian than the current state of law. If 
the state wishes to regulate more strictly than the federal government, 
then one of two things will be true. The first possibility is that federal 
law will not preempt the state’s regulation—perhaps because federal 
law sets a regulatory floor but not a ceiling105—in which case no resort 
to exotic concepts is necessary; the state is free to supplement federal 
regulation as it sees fit. The other is that federal law does preempt 
state regulation. In that event, the state cannot rely on federal 
resource constraints to permit it to regulate more broadly, because 
individuals or businesses affected by the state regulation will be able 
to raise a preemption defense in court when it is enforced against 
them.  
Modern-day nullification thus seems likely to be a viable tactic 
only when a state prefers less regulation on a particular subject than 
does the federal government. It is also unlikely to work where federal 
regulation has direct beneficiaries who would be able to sue to compel 
enforcement of federal law by the courts. Generally speaking, federal 
standing doctrine is stingy about suits by the beneficiaries of regu-
lation arguing that federal authorities are enforcing the law with 
insufficient rigor.106 But Article III does not categorically prohibit such 
suits either. Where permitted access to federal court, beneficiaries of 
federal regulation may prove able to induce federal authorities to en-
force federal law even where they might prefer to pursue other prior-
ities. 
Serious political constraints also exist. National public opinion on 
marijuana places the federal Controlled Substances Act in a kind of 
limbo. There is insufficient public demand for legalization to engender 
a strong political movement for repeal or amendment, but there is 
also insufficient support for prosecuting marijuana users to prompt 
federal authorities to allocate increased resources that might compen-
sate for state noncooperation. It may be that there are other federal 
crimes that arouse similarly ambivalent public attitudes—sports 
betting is one possibility. But it is hard to think of many other 
obvious examples. 
Under the right conditions, however, modern-day nullification 
may well be an attractive mechanism for promoting government 
innovation. The federal government, not to put too fine a point on it,  
105. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemp-
tion, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1558 
(2007). 
106. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753–55 (1984) (denying stand-
ing to parents of black children in public schools who argued that the 
IRS was inadequately enforcing rules and that segregated private schools 
cannot claim tax-exempt status). 
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has been largely dysfunctional for the better part of the last two-and-
a-half presidential administrations. The “mess in Washington” has not 
only torpedoed the approval ratings of presidents and the Congress; it 
has also contributed to a significant and persistent decline in public 
trust for federal governmental institutions.107 As Robert Mikos has 
pointed out, the trust disadvantage that the federal government now 
suffers vis-à-vis state and local governments is one reason that 
modern-day nullification can be successful.108 When state governments 
are more trusted than the Feds, state judgments about, say, the 
appropriateness of marijuana use more readily displace the moral 
suasion of federal law. 
State governments are not only more trusted; they are also 
frequently more able to act on matters of current social concern. That 
is because, unlike the national government, a significant number of 
states have unitary governments—that is, the same party controls the 
governorship and both houses of the state legislature.109 Nonetheless, 
where federal statutes like the CSA’s marijuana prohibition are 
already in place, gridlock at the federal level may prevent efforts to 
facilitate state policy innovation. Federalism scholars (including this 
one) have often cited the difficulty of enacting federal law as a 
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safeguard of state autonomy.110 Carlos Vazquez has pointed out, how-
ever, that “[r]ather than protect state interests, [the difficulty of 
enacting federal law] privileges the legal status quo—whether that 
status quo be state law or federal.”111 Hence, the federal legislative 
gauntlet “sometimes hinders the devolution of legislative power to the 
states.”112 Modern-day nullification may break this sort of impasse, 
returning us to a federalist solution in which individual states can 
effectively legalize or criminalize a particular activity by choosing 
whether to cooperate with federal enforcement.  
State divergence from federal enforcement priorities may also help 
untangle one of the intractable separation of powers puzzles in con-
temporary law—that is, how to curb the national executive’s 
discretion not to enforce, and sometimes not to defend in court, 
particular federal statutes. Most agree that prosecutorial discretion is 
a valuable safeguard that allows the executive to do a more nuanced 
form of justice in particular cases; most would likewise acknowledge 
that the executive ought not to have its own nullification power by 
declining to enforce laws with which it disagrees. And yet, partly 
because drawing the proper boundary is so difficult, there are 
virtually no institutional checks on the Executive’s enforcement 
discretion. One possibility would be for states to harness potential 
disagreement between the President and the states by authorizing 
states to enforce federal law where the President refuses to do so.  
Justice Scalia suggested in Printz that this sort of circumvention 
of the national executive is unconstitutional under the unitary 
executive principle.113 That argument, however, proves too much—it 
suggests that not only commandeering but all cooperative federalism 
arrangements (as well as enforcement of federal law by private 
attorneys general) must be unconstitutional. More recently, in 
Arizona v. United States,114 the Court treated the question whether 
Arizona could enforce federal immigration laws more aggressively 
than the President had chosen to do as a pure question of 
congressional intent. Although the Court found preemption in that 
case, the Court’s analysis strongly implied that if Congress chose to 
authorize state enforcement that went further than the Executive 
wished, there would be no constitutional impediment to doing so.  
 
110. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 47, at 1339–40. 
111. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 
Nationalism, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1601, 1603 (2008). 
112. Id. 
113. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922–23 (1997). 
114. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
Modern-Day Nullification 
794 
Conclusion 
Nullification is dead. South Carolina lost the constitutional debate 
over resistance to the State, and the South lost the Civil War. And 
yet, state resistance to federal authority persists. California, Colorado, 
and other states have demonstrated that, at least in some circum-
stances, states can establish a legal regime contrary to federal law 
simply because the national government lacks the resources and poli-
tical will to enforce its rules without state cooperation.  
This contemporary form of nullification can tell us some impor-
tant things about federalism. It suggests, for instance, that the most 
important zone of state autonomy is a state’s control over its own 
officials. Even when spheres of regulatory jurisdiction overlap, the fact 
that state officials do not work for federal authorities affords the 
states important opportunities to influence—and sometimes defy—the 
enforcement of federal law. California’s and Colorado’s example may 
also offer an attractive way to mitigate national gridlock and, per-
haps, to ease otherwise intractable separation of powers tensions 
arising from the national Executive’s enforcement discretion. 
Long live nullification. 
 
